

BEFORE THE LAND USE BOARD OF APPEALS  
OF THE STATE OF OREGON

BOTTS MARSH, LLC,

Petitioner,

vs.

CITY OF WHEELER,

Respondent.

and

OREGON COAST ALLIANCE,

Respondent-Intervenor

LUBA NO. 2022-002

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OREGON COAST ALLIANCE'S RESPONSE BRIEF

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1 I. RESPONSE TO PETITIONERS' STANDING TO APPEAL

2 Intervenor-Respondent Oregon Coast Alliance (ORCA) does not contest  
3 Petitioners' standing to appeal.

4 II. RESPONSE TO STATEMENT OF THE CASE

5 A. NATURE OF THE LAND USE DECISION AND RELIEF SOUGHT

6 ORCA disagrees with Petitioner's legal conclusions. ORCA requests that  
7 LUBA affirm the City's decision.

8 ORCA will provide a response to the Second and Third Assignments of  
9 Error.

10 B. SUMMARY OF RESPONSE TO ARGUMENTS

11 *Second Assignment of Error:* The City's findings correctly construe, are  
12 adequate, and are supported by substantial evidence with regard to WZO  
13 11.050(4)(a)(6), (b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), and (b)(5).

14 *Third Assignment of Error:* The City did not act outside its range of  
15 jurisdiction, and the Petitioner's reliance on ORS 197.195(1).

16 C. RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S SUMMARY OF MATERIAL  
17 FACTS

18 ORCA believes the applicant's summary of material facts is largely  
19 irrelevant. ORCA adopts the summary of material facts contained in Respondent  
20 City of Wheeler's Response Brief.  
21

1 III. JURISDICTION

2 Intervenor does not dispute that LUBA has jurisdiction over this matter.

3 IV. RESPONSE TO SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

4 The City’s findings regarding WZO 11.050 determined that the applicant did  
5 not satisfy five separate criteria. If LUBA affirms any single criterion, then LUBA  
6 should affirm the City’s decision as it relates to Petitioner’s Second Assignment of  
7 Error. *See Johns v. City of Lincoln*, 34 Or LUBA 594 (1998) (“On review of a  
8 local government’s denial of a development permit, the local government is  
9 required to establish nly one basis for denying petitioner’s application.”); *R/C*  
10 *Pilots Assoc. v. Marion County*, \_\_\_ Or LUBA \_\_\_ (LUBA No. 96-250, October 2,  
11 1997) *citing Baughman v. Marion County*, 17 Or LUBA 632, 636 (1989).

12 A. Response to WZO 11.050(4)(a)(6)

13  
14 WZO 11.050(4)(a)(6) requires that building entrances have certain  
15 characteristics:

16 “Primary building entrances shall open directly to the outside and shall have  
17 walkways connecting them to the street sidewalk. Create storefronts and  
18 entries that are visible and easily accessible from the street. Either orient the  
19 primary entrance to the building along a street facing property line or create  
20 an ADA accessible courtyard / plaza incorporating pedestrian amenities  
21 including street trees, outdoor seating and decorative pavers. Ensure a direct  
22 pedestrian connection between the street and buildings on the site, and  
23 between buildings and other activities within the site. In addition, provide  
24 for connections between adjacent sites, where feasible.”

25  
26 The relevant findings in support of denial provide as follows:  
27



1 “the applicant must ensure a direct pedestrian connection between the  
2 buildings and other activities, including direct pedestrian access from the  
3 one side of the parking lot to the buildings. The site plan demonstrates that a  
4 direct pedestrian connection is frustrated by the loading area, placed in the  
5 middle of the building and on the eastside of the building facing the street,  
6 effectively dividing the parking lot and not allowing direct pedestrian access  
7 to the entrance for half of the parking spaces. This design would appear to  
8 create safety problems for patrons and workers accessing the building to  
9 have to navigate forklifts or trucks that are loading/unloading. Entryways on  
10 the west and north appear to be doors but no access to those doors via  
11 sidewalks. Effectively, those entryways do not connect to the street because  
12 the sidewalks do not even connect to the entryways. As such, the applicant  
13 has failed to carry its burden under this criterion, and this criterion is not  
14 satisfied.

15  
16 First, Petitioner takes issue with WZO 11.050(4)(a)(6), which focuses on “primary  
17 building entrances.” Below, the applicant alleged that there was only one “primary  
18 entrance to the building,” which is at the south side of the building: “Primary  
19 entrance to the building will be located on the south portion of the building. The  
20 primary entrance will lead to a created ADA accessible courtyard. (See Exhibit II –  
21 Site Plan).” R 216-217. Despite this, the applicant, in its brief, uses the plural  
22 “Primary entrances.” *See e.g.*, Petition at 23 (“there are sidewalks encircling the  
23 parking lot that connect the building’s *primary entrances*”) (emphasis added).

24 Second, the applicant’s design has restricted half of the parking lot by  
25 frustrating (*i.e.*, blocking) the sidewalk from directly connecting to the primary  
26 entrance. The sidewalk does not “encircle[e]” the parking lot, as alleged by the  
27 applicant and as demonstrated on the site plans. Petition at 22 (Petitioner alleging  
28 that “there are sidewalks encircling the parking lot”). Half of the parking lot

1 sidewalk is disconnected from the primary entrance as a result of the loading dock,  
2 as well as the entry. There is simply no direct connection from one half of the  
3 parking lot to the other half of the parking lot, as evidenced by the site plans. *See*  
4 R 94, 96, 97, 100.

5 Third, Petitioner alleges that the “Decision does not explain *how* the loading  
6 area frustrates pedestrian connections between the building and other activities on  
7 the site.” Petition at 23 (emphasis in original). Petitioner is feigning ignorance.  
8 The loading area clearly interrupts (*i.e.*, frustrates) the continuity of the sidewalk,  
9 which conflicts with the criterion. The applicant is capable of designing a site plan  
10 that includes a sidewalk that “[e]nsure[s] a direct pedestrian connection between  
11 the street and buildings on the site, and between buildings and other activities  
12 within the site.” The entrance to the parking lot also frustrates the continuity of the  
13 sidewalk. *See* R 96-97 (site plans). If half of the parking lot is restricted, by way  
14 of the loading dock and the entrance to the site, then the applicant has not designed  
15 a “direct pedestrian connection” between the building and the other activities,  
16 including the other half of the parking lot. In other words, there is no direct access  
17 from half of the parking lot to the commercial part of the building. Moreover, the  
18 “safety issues” raised at the Petition at 23 are merely products of failing to provide  
19 the “direct pedestrian connection.” “Safety” is not directly an approval criterion,

1 but “safety” does appear to be reason for the “direct pedestrian connection”  
2 requirement.

3 Petitioner points to the findings for WZO 11.050(4)(a)(10), but Petitioner’s  
4 argument is misplaced. Petition at 23. That provision only requires a “hard-  
5 surfaced” access system. The City never found that patrons would be required to  
6 traverse grassy knolls, climb embankments, or wade through water to get to the  
7 entrance. Clearly, the parking lot and sidewalks would all be “hard-surfaced,” but  
8 that is a different standard than what is required under WZO 11.050(4)(a)(6). The  
9 findings for WZO 11.050(4)(b)(6) are no different when referencing a “concrete  
10 walkway.” Providing for a hard-surfaced sidewalk that is interrupted by a hard-  
11 surfaced loading area and a hard-surfaced parking lot is not a “direct pedestrian  
12 connection,” in the City’s view. The applicant must simply connect the parking  
13 area (*i.e.*, other activities) to the commercial and industrial parts of the building,  
14 including the primary entrance, via a direct pedestrian connection. It is not enough  
15 to satisfy this criterion to have patrons and workers access the commercial part of  
16 the building, including the primary building entrance, without having to dodge  
17 incoming vehicles – whether that is for purposes of loading in the middle of the  
18 parking lot or for those entering and exiting the parking lot via the entrance.

19 Petitioner also takes issue with the following findings:

20 “In order to avoid having an entrance facing the street, the applicant alleges  
21 that “[t]he primary entrance will lead to a created ADA accessible



1 courtyard.’ A courtyard is generally defined as an unroofed area that is  
2 completely or mostly enclosed by the walls of a large building. There does  
3 not appear to be any such place on the site plans. However, even assuming  
4 that the applicant could satisfy such a definition, there does not appear to be  
5 any courtyard identified on any site plan in the record. Moreover, there is no  
6 evidence identifying what the applicant proposes as a courtyard or what such  
7 a courtyard would look like. At a very minimum, the applicant would have  
8 to identify a courtyard on the site plan, but the applicant has failed to make  
9 such a showing. In the absence of a courtyard, the applicant is required to  
10 place the entrance facing the street. Again, the site plans plainly show that  
11 the entrance does not face the street. Without evidence in the record of a  
12 courtyard and its location or a street-facing entrance, the applicant failed to  
13 carry its burden. Therefore, this criterion is not satisfied.”  
14

15 It is undisputed that the primary entrance does not face the street, and, therefore,  
16 the applicant must “create an ADA accessible courtyard / plaza incorporating  
17 pedestrian amenities including street trees, outdoor seating and decorative pavers.”  
18 WZO 11.050(4)(a)(6). Moreover, at no time below did the applicant allege that it  
19 was providing a “plaza,” despite now alleging that a plaza is consistent with the  
20 site plans. Moreover, none of the site plans identify a “plaza.”

21 The applicant only alleged, in a single statement, that “[t]he primary  
22 entrance will lead to a created ADA accessible courtyard (See Exhibit II – Site  
23 Plan),” R 68, but the application does not identify a courtyard on any of the site  
24 plans (and does not include any of the listed amenities on the site plan), *see* R 83-  
25 87, 94, 96, 97. Other than a staff statement, there is nothing on a site plan that  
26 identifies a “courtyard.” As such, Petitioner’s allegations about a plaza are  
27 occurring for the first time here.

1           Petitioner concedes that “courtyard” is not defined in the WZO, Petition at  
2 24, an alleges that the dictionary definition would “frustrate the intent of guideline  
3 4.a.6, which is to provide a *direct pedestrian connection*,” *id.* Petitioner alleges  
4 that “[i]f the proposed courtyard were [*sic*] ‘completely or mostly enclosed by a  
5 large building,’ the storefront would no longer be visible and easily accessible as  
6 the guideline requires.” *Id.* There could be an inherent contradiction if the  
7 courtyard were completely enclosed but if not completely enclosed, then the  
8 requirements of the guidelines can still be satisfied. Moreover, because the street  
9 does not face a street, it remains to be seen how the primary entrance is visible  
10 from the street. Instead, what is most visible from the street is a parking lot and a  
11 loading dock.

12           B.     Response to WZO 11.050(4)(b)(1)  
13

14           WZO 11.050(4)(b)(1) requires that new development be compatible with the  
15 site and adjoining buildings; it provides as follows:

16           “The height and scale of the buildings should be compatible with the site and  
17 adjoining buildings. Use of materials should promote harmony with the  
18 surrounding structures and site. The materials shall be chosen and  
19 constructed to be compatible with the natural elements and applicable city  
20 ordinances.”  
21

22           The relevant findings for WZO 11.050(4)(b)(1) provide as follows:

23           “while the applicant's response to this criterion simply lists the materials  
24 proposed to be used, the applicant has not proposed how the height and scale  
25 of the proposed buildings will be compatible with the site or adjoining  
26 buildings. Similarly, the applicant has not indicated how the materials

1 proposed will promote harmony with the structures and site. Instead, the  
2 applicant has simply listed the proposed materials. Finally, the applicant has  
3 not demonstrated how the materials are compatible with the natural  
4 elements. The City Council is unable to discern the applicant's rationale for  
5 the applicant's proposal. Without some argument and evidence in the record  
6 to demonstrate how the materials chosen are compatible and promote  
7 harmony, the Council cannot find that this provision has been satisfied.  
8 Moreover, the applicant has not included in the record any information on  
9 the "natural elements" that are identified in this criterion and for which there  
10 must be a finding of compatibility. As such, the applicant has not carried its  
11 burden of proof in demonstrating how this criterion is satisfied."  
12

13 Despite including a mandatory approval criterion employing the word "shall,"

14 WZO 11.050(4)(b)(1) ("The materials shall be chosen and constructed to be

15 compatible with the natural elements and applicable city ordinances."), the

16 applicant refers to this requirement as "soft." Petition at 25. Even the applicant

17 cites to the WZO and acknowledges that "[t]he word shall is mandatory[.]" *Id.*

18 Inconsistent with the applicant's burden of proof, the applicant alleges that it was

19 not incumbent upon the applicant "to provide specific evidence, argument, or draft

20 findings demonstrating 'compatibility' and 'harmony.'"

21 The applicant, in response to this criterion, below simply listed "types of

22 material," R 70, but did not address how those materials are "compatible with the

23 natural elements." If the applicant failed to provide any rationale as to why the

24 materials provided are "compatible with the natural elements," then it is not the

25 City's job to do that work for the applicant. Despite not providing this information

26 below, the applicant now attempts to shore up the failure by providing the missing

1 rationale. *See* Petition at 26 (alleging that “site plans show that the footprint and  
2 configuration of the building and parking lot fit into the site by following the  
3 curved Marine Drive alignment to the east and the sinuosities of the Nehalem Bay  
4 shoreline to the west.”). The applicant’s attempts at this late-stage is insufficient.

5 Petitioner next argues that it need only submit “a site plan, building  
6 elevations, and a plot plan” in order to satisfy all criteria. *See* Petition at 27. But  
7 that is not all that the applicant submitted below. Indeed, the applicant submitted a  
8 brief narrative. *See* R 66-74. Despite the applicant’s failure to make the relevant  
9 arguments below in support of the criteria, pursuant to the applicant’s burden of  
10 proof, the applicant purports to place “at least some of the ‘burden of proof’ for  
11 knowledge of the site and surrounding areas on the City.” Petition at 27.

12 C. Response to WZO 11.050(4)(b)(2)

13  
14 WZO 11.050(4)(b)(2) requires the City to evaluate the quality of design for  
15 new development; it provides as follows:

16 “Architectural style should not be restricted[.] Evaluation of a project should  
17 be based on quality of design and the relationship to its surroundings.  
18 However, the use of styles characteristic of Wheeler and the coastal area are  
19 preferred. These include the use of natural wood siding such as cedar  
20 shingles. The City encourages the use of pitched roofs, large overhangs,  
21 wood fences and wood signs. Colors should be earth tones harmonious with  
22 the structure, with bright or brilliant colors used only for accent.”

23  
24 Petitioner sets forth the relevant findings at Petition at 28-29. *See also* R 31-32.

25 As noted by the findings, the applicant alleged that “Project design was influenced

1 from historical pictures of previous buildings in Wheeler’ and points to Exhibit III,  
2 which is an elevation of the building at issue. Notably, the applicant did not  
3 provide any “historical pictures of previous buildings in Wheeler.” Accordingly,  
4 without any evidence to support the criterion, the City found that the applicant  
5 failed to carry its burden of proof. R 16.

6 While the standard states that “architectural style should not be restricted,”  
7 the City requires some evidence to show that the remainder of the standard is  
8 somehow satisfied. The City is not requiring “strict adherence” but rather a  
9 modicum of evidence to demonstrate that the applicant is even addressing the  
10 standard. If the applicant alleges that the building is based on historic buildings,  
11 but fails to provide any evidence of such historic buildings, then the applicant has  
12 not submitted evidence to support its allegations.

13 D. Response to WZO 11.050(4)(b)(3)

14  
15 WZO 11.050(4)(b)(3) requires new development to provide some level of  
16 visual interest through design; it provides: “Monotony of design in single or  
17 multiple building projects shall be avoided. Variety of detail, form, and site design  
18 shall be used to provide visual interest.” The relevant findings are as follows:

19 “The Council finds that the applicant has not carried its burden under WZO  
20 11.050(4)(b)(3). The proposed structure is largely dominated by gray/black  
21 metal with only a small amount of wood proposed. The Council notes that  
22 other provisions of the zoning ordinance encourage natural wood siding.  
23 Here, there is only a relatively small amount of the structure devoted to  
24 natural wood. Monotony is defined as a lack of variety, tedious repetition,

1 and routine. The Council finds that the use of two materials, with the  
2 exception of the roofing and windows, to lack variety and to be monotonous.  
3 The Council finds that it does not provide visual interest. The north and west  
4 elevations show nothing but the similar patterns of windows amidst  
5 gray/black metal siding and a single door. The Council finds the north and  
6 west elevations are particularly monotonous and lack detail. Given the site's  
7 location on the waterfront, the Council believes the requirements in this  
8 criterion are particularly important. The Council finds that the applicant has  
9 submitted inconsistent information regarding the window trim. On one hand,  
10 the vinyl windows are referred to as white in the narrative, yet they appear  
11 black in elevations and plans. The Council finds that the applicant has not  
12 satisfied this criterion.”

13  
14 R 15.

15 Petitioner’s primary argument under this criterion is that the staff report  
16 should be followed instead of the City Council’s findings. The staff report  
17 identifies a “break in the roof line,” a contrasting “wooden exterior” and a “metal  
18 structure,” that there are windows, and that there is an entrance. *See* R 110 (staff  
19 report). Simply put, windows and an entrance are not a “variety of detail, form,  
20 and site design” that provides “visual interest.” Instead, windows and an entrance  
21 are routine, normal components of a building.

22 Regardless, the City reviewed the site plans and the applicant’s narrative,  
23 including the gray/black metal with a small amount of wood. *See* R 15; R 94  
24 (representation showing eastside of building with only a small amount of wood).

25 The City acknowledged that the applicant only used two materials, and that the  
26 overwhelming amount of material was black/gray metal. R 15, 94. The City  
27 reviewed the definition of “variety” and determined that the north and west sides of



1 the building lack variety and are routine in that they “show nothing but the similar  
2 patterns of windows amidst gray/black metal siding and a single door.” R 15. The  
3 City’s interpretation of “monotony” is entitled to deference. *See Siporen v. City of*  
4 *Medford*, 243 P.3d 776 (2010).

5 Petitioner alleges that “the Decision does not even reference breaks in the  
6 roof line, windows and entrances[.]” Petition at 31. Not so. The findings above  
7 explicitly refer to the roofing and the windows, as well as the doors on the north  
8 and west side of the building. The City found that the windows from the  
9 elevations showed similar patterns, which did not show a “variety.” Petitioner  
10 alleges, for the first time, a variety of arguments in support that were never set  
11 forth below. For example, the applicant alleges that it demonstrated a “variety of  
12 *site design* in the configuration of the building and parking lot, which fit into the  
13 site by following the Marine Drive alignment to the east and the Nehalem Bay  
14 shoreline to the west, and also in exceeding the landscaping requirement for the  
15 building’s east elevation.” Petition at 32 (emphasis in original). If the applicant  
16 wanted the City to entertain such arguments, then the applicant should have done  
17 so below, pursuant its burden of proof. The City is not in a position to make the  
18 applicant’s case. It is not enough to believe that the City should implicitly  
19 understand what the applicant believes if the applicant does not set forth such  
20 arguments in some manner. The findings determine that the use of two materials,

1 with the exceptions of roofing and windows, are monotonous and lack variety and  
2 visual interest. If the applicant were to use a greater variety of materials and did  
3 not use similar patterns of windows and doors, then it is likely that the applicant  
4 can satisfy this criterion.

5 Next, Petitioner argues that “the Decision contradicts the conclusion of  
6 noncompliance with guideline 4.b.(3),” Petition at 32, by pointing to the findings  
7 for WZO 11.050(4)(b)(9) and (b)(10). WZO 11.050(4)(b)(9) provides that  
8 “[m]ulti-story commercial, mixed-use or multifamily dwellings shall have ground  
9 floors defined and separated from upper stories by architectural features that  
10 visually identify the transition from ground floor to upper story.” R 16. The  
11 findings state that [t]he commercial portion of the structure has a distinct roof  
12 separation and exterior finish (metal ground floor, wood second floors which  
13 visually separates the two floors. In addition, the second floor runs perpendicular  
14 to the ground floor.” *Id.* WZO 11.050(4)(b)(3) and (b)(9) contain different  
15 requirements. Petitioner would prefer that satisfying (b)(9) would be sufficient  
16 (b)(3), but, again, they contain different requirements. Nothing about satisfying  
17 (b)(9) means that (b)(3) must also be satisfied. As for WZO 11.050(4)(b)(10), the  
18 findings address “shielded lighting on street-facing elevations,” which is only one  
19 of four sides to the development. The finding for the east side of the building does  
20 not control the “[v]ariety of detail, form, and site design” for the entire building.

1 Under (b)(3), more than a single side of the building was addressed. In fact, the  
2 findings for (b)(10) explicitly note that the “north and west sides of the structure  
3 contain blank walls ....” R 35. Even assuming the eastside of the building breaks  
4 up the monotony, the north and west elevations are blank walls, and Petitioner does  
5 not dispute those findings. Because (b)(3) addresses the entire building, and  
6 (b)(10) addresses only a single side of the building, Petitioner’s argument is  
7 misplaced.

8 Notably, the applicant does not address or allege fault in the findings related  
9 to the applicant “submitted inconsistent information regarding window trim. On  
10 one hand, the vinyl windows are referred to as white in the narrative, yet the appear  
11 black in elevations and plans.” R 15; R 83, 84, 94 (showing black trim); R 70 (list  
12 of types of material: “Windows: Vinyl/white trimp”). If the applicant has not  
13 submitted consistent information about the detail of the structure, then the  
14 application cannot satisfy a criterion that requires the City to look to the design of  
15 the building. However, if the applicant submits consistent information about the  
16 design of the building with further variety, then the applicant can likely satisfy this  
17 criterion.

18 E. Response to WZO 11.050(4)(b)(5).

19 WZO 11.050(4)(b)(5) requires the City to take into account views from  
20 adjacent or other areas; it provides: “The impact that structures will have on views  
21

1 from adjacent or other areas will be taken into account.” The findings for this  
2 criterion provide as follows:

3 “The City Council finds that there is evidence in the record that the proposal  
4 will block views from an adjacent or other area, including a residence across  
5 highway 101. The Council finds that the "adjacent" and "other areas" is  
6 broad enough to include the residence across from Highway 101. The  
7 applicant's justification that “[t]he building will be no taller than 24 feet,  
8 which is the allowable height.” The Council finds that this criterion is not  
9 reduced to the maximum height allowed but rather whether there will be an  
10 impact to structures that have views. If the criterion could be satisfied  
11 merely by complying with the height restriction, then the criterion would  
12 have no independent purpose from the height restriction, making it  
13 superfluous. This criterion is intended to protect views, including those from  
14 adjacent structures or structures in other areas. The Council finds that the  
15 residence at 175 Nehalem Boulevard is such a structure that would have its  
16 view of the Nehalem Bay adversely affected. The Council finds that this  
17 criterion has not been satisfied.”

18  
19 R 15-16. As noted in the findings, the only rationale provided by the applicant  
20 below was that “[t]he building will be no taller than 24 feet, which is the allowable  
21 height.” R 71. Because the applicant did not even attempt to disclose that other  
22 structures could be affected, the applicant did not take that structure “into  
23 account.” Instead, the applicant only focused on its own building without regard to  
24 other adjacent structures in the area. If the applicant “take[s] into account” views  
25 from other structures and other areas, then the applicant may very well be capable  
26 of satisfying this criterion, but, again, the applicant provided nothing in the way of  
27 evidence or argument to address this criterion. Petitioner alleges that 90 percent of  
28 the site is open space, citing to R 63, 71, 86, 87, 96, 110. Unfortunately, none of

1 those record citations indicate that the site is 90% open space, assuming that is a  
2 correct statement. Again, the applicant is attempting to carry its burden of proof  
3 too late. Had the applicant made such an argument, supported by evidence in the  
4 record, and “taken into account” views from adjacent dwellings and other areas,  
5 then the applicant could have satisfied this criterion. The applicant, however, did  
6 not take any other structures or areas into account when attempting to demonstrate  
7 whether views would be affected.

8         Petitioner refers to this criterion as “soft, discretionary guideline,” Petition at  
9 33, but the criterion uses the word “will,” which is not consistent with what the  
10 Petitioner characterizes as “soft.” The criterion is, however, discretionary.  
11 Regardless, the applicant did not present *any* evidence – aside from the height of  
12 the building – about the views from adjacent or other areas. The applicant’s  
13 refusal – intentional or not – to consider any such views did not assist the  
14 application.

15 V.     RESPONSE TO THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR – The City did not act  
16 outside its range of jurisdiction.

17 A.     Response to Argument

18  
19         Petitioner argues that “[s]tandards that have not been incorporated into the  
20 applicable land use regulations do not provide applicable criteria and may not be

1 relied upon as reasons for denial.” Petition at 35 (citing ORS 197.195(1)). In full,  
2 ORS 197.195(1) provides that:

3 “A limited land use decision shall be consistent with applicable provisions of  
4 city or county comprehensive plans and land use regulations. Such a  
5 decision may include conditions authorized by law. Within two years of  
6 September 29, 1991, cities and counties shall incorporate all comprehensive  
7 plan standards applicable to limited land use decision into their land use  
8 regulations. A decision to incorporate all, some, or none of the applicable  
9 comprehensive plan standards into land use regulations shall be undertaken  
10 as a post-acknowledgment amendment under ORS 197.610 to 197.625. If a  
11 city or county does not incorporate its comprehensive plan provisions into its  
12 land use regulations, the comprehensive plan provisions may not be used as  
13 a basis for a decision by the city or county or on appeal from that decision.”  
14

15 The statute is concerned with applying comprehensive plan provisions to limited  
16 land use decisions, *see Paterson v. City of Bend*, 49 Or LUBA 160, *aff’d, in part*,  
17 *rev’d and rem’d on other grounds*, 201 Or App 344, 118 P3d 842 (2005), and the  
18 City’s decision does nothing of the sort.

19 Instead, Petitioner argues that “[t]he City based its findings of  
20 noncompliance with the design review guidelines primarily on Petitioner’s alleged  
21 failure to provide argument or draft findings relating to compliance.” Petition at  
22 35. Petitioner further posits that:

23 “there is simply nothing in the WZO to suggest that the site plan, building  
24 elevations, and plot plan – all of which are required by WZP Section  
25 11.050.3 – do not provide the necessary evidence to show compliance with  
26 the design review guidelines or that a design review applicant must provide  
27 extensive written findings on each and every design guideline.”  
28



1 *Id.* First, Petitioner misses the mark because the applicant must carry its burden of  
2 proof. Simply submitting any “site plan” or “elevation” is not sufficient to approve  
3 an application, especially if they are not aided by any argument or if they contain  
4 conflicting information . The standards require more. They require  
5 “compatibility,” “harmony,” a design that avoids monotony, amongst other value-  
6 laden, discretionary criteria. The code provides that “no permit will be issued until  
7 site plans have been reviewed and approved under Comprehensive Plan Policies  
8 and Ordinance Provisions \* \* \*,” WZO 11.050.2, but that does not mean that all  
9 site plans, bereft of some argument or rationale, must automatically be approved.  
10 Indeed, Petitioner acknowledges that “the applicant is responsible for  
11 demonstrating compliance with the applicable design review guidelines[.]” Petition  
12 at 35. TheThe City is not able to supply a rationale for the applicant for why  
13 various discretionary and subjective design review criteria are satisfied, if the site  
14 plans, elevations, and so forth do not address all applicable criteria (or that they  
15 contain unexplained inconsistencies), then the applicant cannot be heard to  
16 complain under ORS 197.195(1). Indeed, while the WZO 11.050(2) and (3)  
17 identify elements that must be provided, WZO 11.050(4)(a) and (b) include a host  
18 of “guidelines [that] shall be used by the Planning Commission in the evaluation of  
19 proposals[.]” WZO 11.050(4). Those guidelines are within the WZO, not the

1 comprehensive plan. As such, the applicant's argument under ORS 197.195(1) is  
2 misplaced and must be rejected.

3 VI. CONCLUSION

4 ORCA respectfully requests that LUBA affirm the City's decision.

5 Respectfully submitted this 21st day of March, 2022.

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15

**CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE, FILING, AND SERVICE**

16

17

18

19

I certify that (1) this brief complies with the word-count limitation in OAR

661-010-0030(2) and (2) the word count of this brief as described in OAR 661-

010-0030(2) is 4754 words.

20

I certify that on March 21, 2022, I filed the original of Intervenor's Response

21

Brief along with four copies with the Land Use Board of Appeals, DSL Building,

22

775 Summer Street NE, Suite 330, Salem OR 97301-1283, by Certified First Class

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24

I also certify that on March 21, 2022, I served a true and correct copy of this

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